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Abstract
Standard liability insurance policies typically contain a clause vesting in the insurer the right
to “make such investigation, negotiation and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient.”
KEYWORDS: liability, limits, policy
The Insurer's Liability for Judgments in Excess of
Policy Limits and the Movement toward Strict Liability:
An Assessment*
DONALD A. ORLOVSKYt
Standard liability insurance policies typically contain a clause vesting
in the insurer the right to "make such investigation, negotiation and
settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient."' While this clause
gives the insurer complete control over the settlement of claims arising
under the policy, it also forms the basis of the insured's right to recover
damages for liability in excess of policy limits incurred as a result of
the insurer's wrongful refusal to settle claims within those limits. 2 It is
to be noted at the outset that this right of the insured presupposes the
existence of several variables, since it is, at best, questionable whether
an insurer must accept every settlement offer or be liable for the excess.
The scope of the insurer's liability for failure to settle claims within
policy limits is a controversial issue in the law of insurance, replete with
an extensive bibliography. 3 The purpose of this article is not merely to
* The author would like to thank Professor Malcolm D. Talbott of the Rutgers
University School of Law for his assistance, guidance, and encouragement in the prepa-
ration of this article.
t A.B. 1973, Cornell University; J.D. 1976, Rutgers University School of Law.
1. See, e.g., R. Keeton, Insurance Law-Basic Text 658, Appendix G (1971),
where the clause states:[Tihe company shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the insured
seeking damages, even if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false
or fraudulent, and may make such investigation and settlement of any claim or
suit as it deems expedient.
2. See Note, Insurer's Liability to Judgment Creditor of Insured for Wrongful
Refusal to Settle a Claim, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 778 (1967).
3. See generally Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement,
67 HARV. L. REv. 1136 (1954), for a most expansive but somewhat dated analysis of
the conduct of an insurer regarding settlement and the rights and duties arising there-
from. See also Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 739 (1971); Appleman, Circumstances Creating
Excess Liability, 1960 INSURANCE L.J. 553; Appleman, Duty of Liability Insurer
to Compromise Litigation, 26 Ky. L.J. 100 (1938); Arnall, Excess Liability Suits-The
Mounting Need for Strict Liability, 13 ST. Louis U.L.J. 292 (1968); Cochran, The
Obligation to Settle within Policy Limits, 1970 INSURANCE L.J. 583; Annot., 68
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delineate the metes and bounds of the insurer's liability for its wrongful
refusal to settle within policy limits, but also to explore the considera-
tions underlying the growing demand that an insurer be absolutely liable
for any judgment in excess of policy limits following its refusal to settle
a claim. The best point at which to begin is with Crisci v. Security
Insurance Co.,4 the first modern case to give serious consideration to
the strict liability approach.
The facts in Crisci are substantially as follows: The plaintiff, a
seventy-year-old widow, purchased a $10,000 general liability policy to
protect herself against any liability she might incur as a result of injuries
sustained on the premises of her apartment building. As in most liability
policies, Mrs. Crisci's policy contained a clause authorizing her insurer
to conduct her defense and to negotiate any settlement which the insurer
might deem expedient. June DiMare, one of the plaintiffs tenants,
sustained serious injuries as a result of falling through the stairs in
plaintiff's building. Consequently, an action was filed by the tenant
against Mrs. Crisci claiming damages of $400,000.
Pursuant to this defense clause contained in Mrs. Crisci's policy,
Security Insurance Company assumed the defense against the claim,
and twice rejected offers of settlement within the policy limits, even in
the face of several factors indicating that a verdict substantially in excess
of the policy limits was highly probable. The insurer's counsel and
claims adjuster, in fact, believed that a verdict of at least $100,000 would
A.L.R.2d 892 (1959); Comment, Crisci's Dicta of Strict Liability for Insurer's Failure
to Settle: A Move toward Rational Settlement Behavior, 43 WASH. L. REv. 799 (1968);
Erstgaard, Liability beyond Insurance Policy Limits, 1958 INSURANCE L.J. 404; Annot.,
40 A.L.R.2d 168 (1955); Comment, Insurer's Liability for Failure to Settle, 9 MD. L.
REV. 349 (1948); Note, 13 U. CHI. L. REv. 105 (1945); Evans, The Practical Handling
by Defense Counsel of Lawsuits in Excess of Policy Limits, 1960 INSURANCE L.J. 565;
Note, 60 YALE L.J. 1037 (1951); Comment, Insurer's Liabilityfor Judgments Exceeding
Policy Limits, 38 TEx. L. REv. 233 (1960); Note, 32 So. CAL. L. REv. 314 (1959);
Comment, Liability of an Insurer for Failure to Settle Claims, 6 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 124
(1959); Note, 10 HASTINGS L.J. 198 (1958); Levit, The Crisci Case-Something Old,
Something New, 1968 INSURANCE L.J. 12; Note, Direct Action by Injured Judgment
Creditor against Insurer for Excess of Policy Limits, 14 N.Y.L.F. 629 (1968); Luvaas,
Excess Judgments-Defense Counsel's Liability, 18 DEFENSE L.J. 259 (1968); Com-
ment, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 199 (1968); Comment, 28 MD. L. REv. 166 (1968); Note, 27
Prrr. L. REV. 726 (1967); Note, 46 TEx. L. REV. 113 (1967); Note, Insurer's Liability
to Judgment Creditor of Insured for Wrongful Refusal to Settle a Claim, 52 CORNELL
L.Q. 778 (1967); Note, Excess Liability: Reconsideration ofCalifornia's Bad Faith Neg-
ligence Rule, 18 STAN. L. REV. 475 (1966).
4. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
5. DiMare v. Cresci, 58 Cal. 2d 292, 373 P.2d 860, 23 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1962).
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be returned if the jury believed the claimant's persuasive evidence that
the injuries resulting from her fall proximately caused the development
of her psychosis. Notwithstanding the insurer's inability to produce
evidence which would impeach the claimant's allegations, the insurer
continued to reject offers for settlement within policy limits.6
As a result, the injured tenant recovered judgment for $101,000, and
Mrs. Crisci, through her efforts to meet the $91,000 balance, became
indigent. In addition, Mrs. Crisci suffered a decline in her mental and
physical well being and attempted on several occasions to commit sui-
cide.
Mrs. Crisci brought suit against her liability insurer for wrongfully
refusing to settle the claim within the limits of her policy. At trial, the
court found that Security Insurance breached its duty to settle the claim
in good faith, and awarded plaintiff the amount of the excess judgment
plus interest accrued since the day judgment was entered against her.
In addition, the court awarded the plaintiff $25,000 for the mental suf-
fering which she endured as a result of being forced to dispose of her
property to satisfy the judgment.7
The California Supreme Court upheld Crisci's recovery against the
insurer, holding, inter alia, that Security Insurance had breached its
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.8 What is of greater
significance, however, is the California Court's willingness to find
"more than a small amount of elementary justice"' in the suggestion
made by amicus curiae that an insurer be held absolutely liable when
an excess judgment follows an insurer's refusal to settle within policy
limits."0 The adoption of a strict liability standard for insurers would,
no doubt, mark a drastic turning point in this area of insurance law."
6. See 28 MD. L. REv. 166 n.1 (1968).
7. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 428-29, 426 P.2d 173, 175, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 15.
8. Id. at 429, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16. The implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing as applied in the Crisci case requires that the parties to the
insurance policy conduct themselves so as not to impair the rights of the other party to
receive benefits under the contract. Among the benefits inuring to the insured is peace
of mind and security. The court also reasoned that the settlement of claims without
litigation is another benefit owed by the insurer to its insured and, afortiori, a duty is
imposed upon the insurer to accept reasonable settlement offers as if the policy in
question were without limits.
9. Id. at 432, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
10. Id. at 431, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
I1. See Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168, 177-78 (1955), indicating that such an approach
has not been successfully contended. But see, e.g., Arnall, Excess Liability Suits-The
Mounting Need for Strict Liability, 13 ST. Louis U.L.J. 292 (1968); Note, Excess
3
Orlovsky: The Insurer's Liability for Judgements in Excess of Policy Limits
Published by NSUWorks, 1977
1. THE EXISTING STANDARDS
It is often stated that a claimant's offer to settle a claim against
an insurer for an amount within the limits of a policy nearly always
creates a conflict of interest between the liability insurer and its in-
sured.' 2 The insurer's interest is often best served by accepting only the
lowest possible settlement offer, since, in normal cases, the insurer's
potential liability is fixed by the limits of the policy. Hoping to further
limit his liability through litigation, the insurer may also reject, in toto,
an offer of settlement. The interest of the insured, on the other hand, is
cast in a different mold, since it would distinctly be to his advantage to
have all claims settled within policy limits so as to foreclose forever the
risk of excess liability. The temptation would seem great, then, for the
unconscionable insurer to gamble with the money of its insureds by
rejecting all settlement offers, proceeding to litigation, and virtually
saying to the insured, "heads I win, tails you lose."' 3
Since insurers, in drafting policy provisions, have reserved for
themselves the right to negotiate the settlement of claims, the courts
have responded by imposing a duty upon the- insurer to consider the
interests of the insured when negotiating settlement. 4 The question re-
maining, however, is how much weight is to be given to these conflicting
interests in reaching the decision to settle a given case.
Early decisions indicate that an insurer is not bound to consider the
interest of an insured to the prejudice of its own interest when conflicts
arise during the negotiation of a settlement."5 Opinions of other courts
Liability: Reconsideration of California's Bad Faith Negligence Rule, 18 STAN. L. REv.
475, 482-85 (1968); Note, 60 YALE L.J. 1037, 1041-42 (1951)-all calling for the adop-
tion of a strict liability standard.
12. See Rova Farms Resort, Inc., v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 323
A.2d 495 (1974). See generally Note, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 778, 780 (1967); Annot., 40
A.L.R.2d 168, 170 (1955); Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for
Settlement, 67 HARv. L. REV. 1136, 1142 (1954).
13. See Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 170 S.C. 286, 293, 170 S.E.
346, 348 (1933). In an age of mounting consumerism, it is highly questionable whether
the insurance industry would risk a substantial loss of its business by outwardly mani-
festing such an attitude.
14. See Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Gault, 196 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1952); Zumwalt v.
Utilities Ins. Co., 360 Mo. 362, 228 S.W.2d 750 (1950). Cf Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168,
170-71 (1955); Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, supra
note 3, at 1138.
15. Neuberger v. Preferred Ace. Ins. Co., 18 Ala. App. 72, 89 So. 90, cert. denied,
206 Ala. 700, 89 So. 924 (1921); Abrams v. Factory Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 298 Mass.
141, 10 N.E.2d 82 (1937); McDonald v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 109 N.J.L. 308, 162
Nova Law Journal :977 1
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have varied as to the relative weight to be accorded the interests of the
insured. Some courts have held that the insurer may give paramount
consideration to its own interests,"6 while others firmly insist that it is
the insured's interest which must be the primary concern.' 7 What seems
to be the most widely accepted standard is that the insurer give equal
consideration, 8 or at least as great consideration," to the interest of the
insured, although, compared to the more extreme positions, this is the
most difficult standard to administer.2
The duty imposed upon the insurer to consider the interests of the
insured in negotiating settlement offers has taken on different dimen-
sions in its construction by the courts. One standard upon which the
courts have predicated a finding of the insurer's liability for not consid-
A. 620 (1932); Schmidt & Sons Brewing Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 244 Pa. 286, 90 A.
653 (1914). It is interesting to note that New York has been one of the few jurisdictions
which strongly supports this view. See Brochstein v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 266 F.
Supp. 223 (1967); Best Bldg. Co. v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 247 N.Y. 451, 160
N.E. 911 (1928); Auerbach v. Maryland Cas. Co., 236 N.Y. 247, 140 N.E. 577 (1923);
Brunswick Rlty. Co. v. Frankfort Ins. Co., 99 Misc. 639, 166 N.Y.S. 36 (Sup. Ct. 1917).
16. See, e.g., Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1,231 N.W. 257 (1930);
City of Wakefield v. Globe Indem. Co., 246 Mich. 645, 651-53, 225 N.W. 643, 645
(1929).
17. National Mut. Cas. Co. v. Britt, 203 Okla. 175, 200 P.2d 407 (1948); but see
Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibilityfor Settlement, supra note 3, at 1141 n. 1,
for a brief discussion of the uncertainties of the Oklahoma rule. See also Tyger River
Pine Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 170 S.C. 286, 292, 170 S.E. 346, 348 (1933).
18. See, e.g., Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Henderson, 82 Ariz. 335, 340, 313 P.2d 404,
407 (1957), where the court stated:
By refusing the $4,000 plus property damage and submitting to trial, the limit of
the company's hazard under the policy limits was an additional $1,200. Admit-
tedly the property damage could not exceed $1,500. The jury might infer under
the conditions that a plaintiff's verdict was strongly probable; that the insured's
loss hazard was much greater than that of the company. After the case was
submitted but before verdict, the insurer, by not settling for $6,000 incurred a $500
loss hazard and. . . [the insured] a great deal more. The jury could conclude that
the company in turning down the opportunities to terminate this litigation was
guided principally by its own risk and ignored or at least did not give equal
consideration to the risk which it compelled [the insured] to incur. The jury
therefore was entitled to conclude that the company did not act in good faith.
19. See Douglas v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 81 N.H. 371, 127 A. 708 (1924);
Dumas v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 94 N.H. 484, 56 A.2d 57 (1947); see also
Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, supra note 3, at 1145
n.23.
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ering the interest of his insured is the negligence standard.2' In applying
this, courts must determine whether an ordinarily prudent person in
business would have rejected or accepted a particular settlement offer.2
This test, however, is subject to variation2 when framed in terms of
what action an ordinarily prudent insurance company would take in
reaching a determination on a particular offer if the policy were without
limits.21
Apparently the basis of the negligence formulation is twofold.
First, since the insured has divested himself of the right to control the
defense and settlement of claims, he is entitled to expect reasonable care
and circumspection in the insurer's conduct.21 Secondly, "when one
knows or has reason to anticipate that the person, property, or rights
of another are so situated . . . that they may be injured through his
conduct, it becomes his duty to so govern his actions as not negligently
to injure the person, property, or rights of another."" Thus, it would
seem that an insurer's honest mistake in judgment would not, under the
negligence formulation, render it liable for refusing to settle a claim
within policy limits. t The negligence test has found success when ap-
plied in situations where the insurer fails to consider the extent of the
plaintiff's injuries,2 refuses to act upon the advice of counsel,2 or has
21. See Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168, 186-90 (1955), and the cases cited therein, along
with additional cases cited in the updated supplement to the annotation, for a detailed
analysis of the negligence standard.
22. See, e.g., Dumas v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 94 N.H. 484, 56 A.2d
57 (1947), wherein the insurer refused an opportunity to settle the claim for $1,000 less
than the policy limit, whereupon a subsequent judgment was entered against the insured
for an amount in excess of his policy limit. The court found that, in light of the
claimant's expenses and the permanence of her injuries, a prudent businessman would
have accepted the settlement offer. Accord, Douglas v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 81
N.H. 371, 127 A. 708 (1924).
23. See note 21, supra, at 186-90.
24. See, e.g., Dumas v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 94 N.H. 484, 56 A.2d
57 (1947), where the court used the negligence test interchangeably with the test of the
ordinarily prudent businessman.
25. Boling v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 173 Okla. 160, 46 P.2d 916 (1935).
26. Dumas v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 94 N.H. 484, 56 A.2d 57 (1947).
27. Highway Ins. Underwriters v. Lufkin-Beaumont Motor Coaches, Inc., 215
S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
28. G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex.
Com. App. 1929).
29. Royal Transit, Inc. v. Central Sur. & Ins. Corp., 168 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1948),
cert. denied, 335 U.S. 844 (1948); accord, Lanferman v. Maryland Cas. Co., 222 Wis.
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acted upon the advice of misinformed counsel.3 Moreover, the negli-
gence standard is frequently employed to hold insurers liable for failing
to properly investigate a claim.3'
Another widely adopted standard used for evaluating an insurer's
liability is that of good faith, which, unlike the negligence standard,
requires a showing of an intentional disregard of the financial interests
of the insured.32 It may be said that the good faith rule requires con-
vincing evidence that the company rejected a settlement offer which, in
fact, it considered to be reasonable.? One writer suggests that the
distincton between the good faith and negligence tests is less marked
than those terms, on their face, would suggest.3 Perhaps the major flaw
of the good faith standard is the difficult, if not impossible task of
proving an intentional disregard of the insured's interests. In theory, all
that an insurer need show under this standard is some rational basis to
support its decision to litigate rather than settle a claim.3 Examples
of conduct construed to be acts of bad faith have been found in an
insurer's inducing an insured to contribute to the amount needed to
settle a claim within policy limits; advising an insured to place his
property beyond the reach of an anticipated judgment;7 failing to in-
vestigate a claim so as to ascertain adequate evidence on the issues of
liability and the amount of anticipated damages;8 setting up a reserve
of funds to cover possible liability to the policyholder;" refusing to
accept settlement offers recommended by the adjuster or counsel;40 fail-
30. Douglas v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 81 N.H. 371, 127 A. 708 (1924).
31. See, e.g., Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 312 F.2d 485 (8th
Cir. 1963).
32. Johnson v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 109 Vt. 481, 1 A.2d 817 (1938). See
generally Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, supra note 3,
at 1139 n.6.
33. See, e.g., Georgia Cas. Co. v. Mann, 242 Ky. 447, 46 S.W.2d 777 (1932).
34. See Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, supra note
3, at 1140.
35. See Note, Insurer's Refusal to Settle-A Proposal for Imposition of Liability
above Policy Limits, 60 YALE L.J. 1037, 1040, n.13 (1951).
36. Boling v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 173 Okla. 160, 46 P.2d 916 (1935).
37. Noshey v. American Auto Ins. Co., 68 F.2d 808 (6th Cir. 1934).
38. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Elmira Coal Co., 69 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1934); accord,
Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 312 F.2d 485 (8th .Cir. 1963).
39. Lanferman v. Maryland Cas. Co., 222 Wis. 406, 267 N.W. 300 (1936).
40. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 346 F.2d 484 (8th Cir. 1965); see
also Maryland Cas. Co. v. Elmira Coal Co., 69 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1934); American Mut.
Liab. Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 61 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 736 (1933);
37 1
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ing to settle when the chances of prevailing at court are extremely
doubtful and the accumulated expenses of the case have already ex-
ceeded policy limits;4 and delaying unnecessarily the negotiation of a
settlement offer. 2
It matters little what terminology is used to describe the standard
by which the conduct of the insurer in negotiating settlements will ulti-
mately be judged, for the standard, as applied, is neither good faith nor
negligence but rather a curious blending of the two, designed to meet
the exigencies of a given case.
Before returning to the strict liability analysis suggested in Crisci,
brief mention should be made of the legal underpinnings of an insurer's
duty regarding settlement.
It has often been thought that an action against an insurer for the
wrongful refusal to settle a claim within policy limits sounds in tort;3
however, it is to be noted that aggrieved insureds have also successfully
based their claims in contract.44 Generally, the measure of damages will
depend upon the theory utilized by the plaintiff in framing his com-
plaint. In contract actions, damages are frequently recoverable for
breach of contract only to the extent that they were within the contem-
plation of the parties at the time of the making of the contract, whereas
in tort, the doctrines of foreseeability and proximate cause are determi-
native of the amount of compensation. 45 As Professor Robert Keeton
suggests, however, the theoretical characterization is rarely critical, ex-
cept perhaps in cases involving differing statutes of limitation. 6
Whether one will ultimately view the obligation of an insurer to
settle a claim as a tort or contract obligation depends upon whether the
duty is deemed to arise from the insurer's implied covenant of good
Olympia Fields Country Club v. Bankers Indem. Ins. Co., 325 I1. App. 649, 60 N.E.2d
869 (App. Ct. 1945).
41. City of Wakefield v. Globe Indem. Co., 246 Mich. 645, 225 N.W. 643 (1929).
42. Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W. 257 (1930).
43. R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAw-BAsic TEXT § 7.8 (a), 509 n. 3 (1971).
44. See, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
45. See Note, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 199 (1968) for more detailed coverage on this
point.
46. See R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAw-BAsic TEXT, § 7.8 (a), 509 (1971), where
the author states:
There are a few situations, though only a few, in which the classification is critical.
For example, characterizing the cause of action as one sounding in contract may
result in the application of a longer period of limitation and tends to favor
assignability of the chose in action. On the other hand, characterizing the cause
of action as one sounding in tort may broaden the measure of damages.
_ i
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faith, or from the nature of the relationship existing between the liability
insurer and its insured. A contract action is proper if the duty to settle
is deemed to have arisen out of the insurer's covenant of good faith.
Although no rigid formula exists for determining when an insurance
contract will give rise to a relationship of such independent significance
that a breach of duty arising therefrom will be deemed a tort, it is safe
to say that this will occur in situations where one party contractually
limits himself to such an extent that he is dependent upon the other
party for that protection which he would otherwise be able to provide
for himself.' The California cases are particularly interesting in this
regard, since an injured plaintiff may bring his action in either tort or
contract."
2. THE CRISCI ANALYSIS-TOWARD STRICT LIABILITY
Though it refused to pass on the merits of the strict liability claim,
the court in Crisci" did regard as meritorious the suggestion that insur-
ers be held absolutely liable for their conduct regarding a claim settle-
ment." The court based its findings on four factors: First, the court
recognized that it is within the reasonable expectation of the insured that
his policy coverage will protect him against any claim which may be
settled within policy limits. Second, the court reasoned that, given the
conflict between the interests of the insurer and its insured, and since
only the insurer stands to benefit by refusing a settlement offer and
proceeding to trial, the insurer should be the party to bear the risk of
an adverse judgment. Third, the court stated that since the insurer re-
quires the insured to divest himself of the valuable right to settle claims,
47. Eads v. Marks, 39 Cal. 2d 807, 249 P.2d 257 (1952); cf. Ritchie v. Anchor
Cas. Co., 135 Cal. App. 2d 245, 286 P.2d 1000 (1955).
48. See, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 13 (1967).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 432, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17, where the court states:
[Tihe duty of the insurer to consider the insured's interest ... arises from an
implied covenant in the contract, and ordinarily contract duties are strictly en-
forced and not subject to a standard of reasonableness .... [Tihe rejection of a
settlement within the limits where there is any danger of a judgment in excess of
the limits can be justified, if at all, only on the basis of the interests of the insurer,
and, in light of the common knowledge that settlement is one of the usual methods
by which an insured receives protection under a liability policy, it may not be
unreasonable for an insured. . . to believe that a sum of money equal to the
limits is available.
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the contractual duties of the insurer should be strictly enforced. Finally,
the court based its recognition of strict liability as a viable theory on
considerations of "elementary justice."
At first glance, the arguments favoring the adoption of a strict
liability standard appear persuasive and certainly merit discussion. It is
only in light of the potentially deleterious results of such a standard that
the nonfeasibility of this approach becomes apparent. To this, the court
in Crisci did not address itself.
The strict liability approach to excess recovery would provide a
larger measure of clarity and certainty than the frequently uncertain and
often arbitrarily applied standards of reasonableness and good faith. 5'
Its adoption could eliminate the insurer's difficult task of evaluating
whether a jury will make the determination, based upon a given set of
facts, that a reasonably prudent insurer, in the exercise of good faith,
would have settled the claim within policy limits if the policy were
unlimited. Too often, the only evidence against the insurer is its refusal
to settle within policy limits which, without more, is neither negligence
nor bad faith.52 Moreover, it is argued that, in a private law suit, an
individual who rejects a settlement believing he can benefit through
litigation will be obligated to pay the entire judgment in the event that
he loses. An insurer, more skilled in evaluating risks and better able to
distribute losses, should be treated no more favorably.-
Strict liability would also shift the burden of loss to the insurer, and
create a conclusive presumption of unreasonableness against the insurer
who refuses to settle a claim within policy limits.Y Under the existing
formulations, it is not the clearly culpable insured who suffers, but
rather those defendants whose fault is not as clearly established. In the
case of the clearly culpable defendant, it may be said with some confid-
ence that the insurer would be eager to settle for the lowest possible
amount within the policy limits.
The strict liability approach would further serve to undercut the
temptation of liability insurers to adopt a "no settlement" or "selective
51. See Note, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 199, 202 (1968).
52. See, e.g., Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Viclana, 123 F.2d 692 (2nd Cir. 1942), cert.
denied, 316 U.S. 672 (1942); Georgia Cas. Co. v. Mann, 242 Ky. 447, 46 S.W.2d 777
(1932).
53. See generally Critz v. Farmers Ins. Group, 230 Cal. App. 2d 288, 41 Cal.
Rptr. 401 (3rd Dist. 1964). See also Excess Liability: Reconsideration of California's
Bad Faith Negligence Rule, 18 STAN. L. REV. 475, 484 (1966).
54. See Radio Taxi Serv. Inc. v. Lincoln Mut. Ins. Co., 31 N.J. 299, 304-06, 157
A.2d 319, 323 (1960).
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settlement" policy. In essence, the insurer would be prevented from
using the court system, at the expense of its insured, to establish favora-
ble economic policies. Absolute liability would demand responsible
decision-making. Strict liability would operate to force insurers to po-
lice their own conduct or suffer harsh consequences.
Finally, by holding the liability insurer strictly liable for judg-
ments in excess of policy limits, the public policy consideration of
compensating injured claimants would be better served, since a
judgment-proof insured is not likely to be able to pay an excess judg-
ment. Thus, the protection that would be afforded through the adoption
of strict liability would run not only to the insured but to the injured
claimant as well.
Advocates of the strict liability approach agree that the insurer
should be held to the standard of a fiduciary in light of the valuable right
of settlement foregone by the insured under the policy." Certainly, it
cannot be doubted that an insurer should be held to something stricter
than the morals of the marketplace," yet strict liability, even though it
offers several advantages, is not the answer. Perhaps a fairer and more
conscientious application of the good faith and reasonableness standard
55. See Rova Farms Resort Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 323 A.2d 495
(1974), where the court stated:
We, too, hold that an insurer, having contractually restricted the independent
negotiating power of its insured, has a positive fiduciary duty to take the initiative
and attempt to negotiate a settlement within the policy coverage. Any doubt as
to the existence of an opportunity to settle within the face amount of the coverage
or as to the ability and willingness of the insured to pay any excess required for
settlement must be resolved in favor of the insured unless the insurer, by some
affirmative evidence, demonstrates there was not only no realistic possibility of
settlement within policy limits, but also that the insured would not have contrib-
uted to whatever settlement figure above that sum might have been available.
Id. at 490, 323 A.2d at 507. See also Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168, 173 n.8 (1955).
56. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928), where Chief Judge
Cardozo said of the fiduciary:
[Fiduciaries] owe to one another. . . the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms
of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arms length, are
forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter
than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an
honor most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there has
developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity
has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule
of undivided loyalty by the "disintegrated erosion" of particular exceptions. Only
thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that
trodden by the crowd.
Id. at 461, 164 N.E. at 546.
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by the courts would be better suited to cope with the problem of excess
liability.
Although the arguments supporting strict liability appear attrac-
tive, the adoption of such an approach would serve only to create more
serious problems which, in the long run, would work to the detriment
not only of the insurance industry, but, more importantly, of the insured
public as well. Oversimplified and specious, the arguments supporting
strict liability appear to propose solutions, but in truth they create new
problems.
Strict liability has the undesirable potential of creating new moral
hazards in the field of liability insurance. First, it would allow insureds
to receive what in essence amounts to excess liability coverage without
properly paying for it. No matter how high an insured's liability cover-
age is, it is always possible that some unfortunate event could take place
which would expose the insured to liability in excess of his policy limits.
If the claims asserted against the insured are unreasonable, it seems
neither fair nor consistent with elementary justice to force an insurer to
settle such a claim. Strict liability has this effect; it precludes the liability
insurer from protecting its financial interest. The insured, on the other
hand, may well gain "blanket coverage" arising from the insurer's sim-
ple refusal to settle-a situation that neither he nor his insurer contem-
plated at the time of making the policy. It would seem that "elementary
justice" should be applicable not only to the insured's interests but to
those of the insurer as well. When an insured purchases a policy with
established limits, he assumes the risk that a judgment could be entered
in excess of those limits. When an action is filed against an insured for
an amount in excess of the policy limits, the threat of excess judgment
should be heavily considered by the insurer in negotiating a settlement,
but it should not be controlling.
On its face, the absolute liability standard would seem the easiest
to apply, since the issues are narrowly confined to whether a good faith
offer of settlement was made, communicated to the insurer, and re-
jected. But, in fact, judicial administration becomes a more onerous task
in light of the greater likelihood of collusion between the insured and
the claimant which would undoubtedly accompany the implementation
of strict liability. Since the insured would be free from the threat of
excess liability once a settlement offer were made within policy limits,
it would be to the insured's advantage to urge the claimant to make a
settlement offer. If the claimant is assured of receiving the excess judg-
ment from the insurance company, the two might easily conspire to
mislead the insurer to believe that the chance of recovery is slight. Once
an offer of settlement is made and rejected, the insured would find
12
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himself with excess coverage, and the insurer would incur the additional
expense.5 Perhaps such collusion would be rare, but strict liability is,
at the least, encouragement for claimants to pursue the insurer instead
of the wrongdoer. The risk seems hardly worthwhile.
A further consideration arises when an insured is subject to multi-
ple claims stemming from a single occurrence, particularly when the
totality of the claims substantially exceeds the policy limit. In this situa-
tion, strict liability provides a strong incentive for the insurer to settle
a single claim within the stated obligations of the policy. In so doing,
the insurer is discharged from further liability with respect to the other
claims.58 Such situations are potentially harmful. Frequently the in-
sured's interests are best protected by litigating the multiple claims to
avoid excess recovery. Strict liability would not only cause an insurer
to act with circumspection and restraint, but also would deter the in-
surer from pursuing litigation when litigation might, in the long run, be
the best course of action.
In addition, the strict liability approach not only encourages the
insurer to settle specious claims, but also provides a better bargaining
position for a claimant's so-called nuisance value claims.59 Certainly,
strict liability would provide a climate conducive to an increase in the
number of such claims.
The ultimate detriment of the strict liability formulation would run
not to the insurer, as intended by its proponents, but to the insuring
public who will find the effects of this policy reflected in higher premium
rates. Strict liability would further encourage insurers to raise the mini-
mum coverage of liability policies so as to minimize excess recoveries.
As a result of such risk-spreading, those of moderate income could be
forced either to forego liability coverage altogether or pay a substan-
tially higher premium."
3. THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN
There are a series of cases, though few in number, which refuse to
57. See Note, An Insurance Company's Duty to Settle: Qualified or Absolute,
41 So. CAL. L. REV. 120, 139-42 (1968).
58. Note, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 199, 203 (1968).
59. Id. at 203, 204, where the author states: "To a certain extent, such a develop-
ment seems unavoidable; at least, nuisance plaintiffs would obtain a stronger bargaining
position."
60. See, e.g., Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of America, 65 N.J.
474, 323 A.2d 495 (1974).
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hold an insurer liable for failing to settle claims within the limits of the
policy. The most recent noteworthy case is Brochstein v. Nationwide
Mutual Insurance Co. ,6 in which the court decided that an action could
not be predicated on an insurer's wholly self-interested refusal to settle
within policy limits. The court explicitly rejected the suggestion pro-
pounded by Professor Keeton that an insurer must, in good faith, ap-
proach settlement negotiations as if the policy had no limit.62 Such a
view is not without support.
In Rumford Falls Paper Co. v. Fidelity Casualty Co.,13 an insured
employer brought an action against Fidelity for the amount of the judg-
ment in excess of policy limits on the ground that the insurer's refusal
to settle an employee's claim within policy limits created a contractual
obligation on the part of the insurer to pay the excess judgment. Al-
though the court did recognize that the insured could be placed in a
position of substantial economic danger by the insurer, the court re-
jected the plaintiff's reasoning, holding that the alternative of compel-
ling an insurer to settle all cases or be liable for any excess would leave
the insured free to disregard "those rules of prudence and vigilance
which are indispensible for the reasonable protection of the laborers
engaged in [the insured's] service."'" The court ultimately found that the
settlement clause contained in the policy evidenced the intention of the
contracting parties to vest in the insurer absolute discretion regarding
decisions to settle claims."5 The court clearly recognized that giving an
insured the power to control the settlement of his own case encourages
the settlement of claims which may well prove unfounded if litigated.
In Auerbach v. Maryland Casualty Co.," both the insurer and its
insured agreed that the claim in question should be settled rather than
litigated. Disagreement resulted when the parties failed to agree upon
their respective contributions, the insurer insisting that it would contrib-
ute only 70% of the policy limit, the insured demanding the entire policy
limit.67 Consequently, no settlement was reached, and the claimant re-
covered judgment for an amount substantially in excess of the policy
limit. The court reasoned that an insurance policy, like other contracts,
61. 266 F. Supp. 223 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
62. Id. at 226.
63. 92 Me. 574, 43 A. 503 (1899).
64. Id. at 587, 43 A. at 506.
65. Id. at 580, 43 A. at 504.
66. 236 N.Y. 247, 140 N.E. 577 (1923).
67. Id. at 253, 140 N.E. at 579.
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should be construed according to the sense and meaning of the terms
used by the parties. Since the insurance contract unambiguously gave
the insurer complete control over settlement, the insurer was free from
liability for the excess.68 Subsequent cases have adopted this approach,69
which, simply stated, indicates that, for an insurer to be liable, fraud or
misrepresentation amounting to concealment of relevant facts from the
insured must be shown. 70
In a similar case, Best Building Co. v. Employer's Liability Insur-
ance Co.,7 1 the injured claimant offered to settle at an amount equal to
85% of the insured's policy limit. The insurer, however, refused to settle
for more than 65%. Based on an excess judgment of 160% of the policy
limit, the insured brought suit, alleging that if the insurer had advised
him of the claimant's settlement offer, he would have contributed the
difference to avoid excess liability. Adhering to past New York deci-
sions, the court reaffirmed the reasoning that without a clear showing
of negligence or bad faith, the insurer will not be liable. A further
holding was that an insurer is under no duty to settle claims.
In Brochstein, the claim against the insurer was based upon the
insurers failure to accept an offer to settle the case at 80% of the policy
limit. The verdict returned against the insured amounted to 212% of the
policy. 72 The insurer had offered to settle for 70% of the policy limit.
The claimant refused to settle for less than 90%. The insurer, unable to
reach an amenable settlement figure, apprised the insured that it would
be in his best interest to hire independent counsel, and further warned
the insured of the possibility of an excess verdict. The insured, however,
chose to take no action, relying solely upon the insurer to handle the
case. The court found that there was no mismanagement of the insurer's
investigation or of the court proceedings, and further found that there
was neither a breach of contract nor any other wrong on the insurer's
part." As a result of the factual finding, the court dismissed the action
on the merits, holding that a liability insurer is under no duty to settle
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Streat Coal Co. v. Frankfort Gen. Ins. Co., 237 N.Y. 60, 142 N.E.
352 (1923).
70. Id.
71. 247 N.Y. 451, 160 N.E. 911 (1928).
72. 266 F. Supp. at 224. It should be noted, however, that the actual judgment
was for an amount equal to 190% of the policy limit. Costs and interest brought the
total figure to 212% of the policy limit.
73. Id. at 224.
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within policy limits;7' that bad faith is not shown by refusal to settle or
by other acts suggesting that the insurer pursued its own interest; 5 and
that a liability insurer is not liable for any implicit negligence or lack
of due diligence if neither fraud nor bad faith is proven."
At least one writer criticized the Brochstein opinion for not consid-
ering New York precedents which would have favored the insured. Real-
istically viewed, however, the Brochstein case is merely a fair applica-
tion of the good faith rule. When one examines the many cases involving
the issue of an insurer's liability for refusing to settle claims within
policy limits, it becomes apparent that almost all of the cases are de-
cided in favor of the insured. Could it be that over the years liability
insurers have grown to adhere to a standard of wholly self-interested,
bad faith conduct? It is possible that many jurists and legal scholars
have become missionaries for insureds in many cases where the insurer
acts in good faith and with reasonable care. Brochstein comes at an
appropriate tiie, for it reveals the court's willingness to hold an insurer
liable for judgments in excess of policy limits, but only if fraud or bad
faith conduct is clearly shown. Such a practice, it is urged, will best serve
the principles of "elementary justice" by protecting the rights of both
parties, as opposed to the harsh standard of strict liability which will
leave the insurer and the insuring public without the right to protect
their own interests.
74. Id. at 226.
75. Id. at 225.
76. Id. at 226.
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